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Another Way Of Thinking About Section 105(a)
And Other Sources of Supplemental Law
Under the Bankruptcy Code
By
Steve H. Nickles
David G. Epstein
I.

Introduction
We are involved in research exploring the wholesale authority of bankruptcy
courts to supplement the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. By supplement, we
mean to make decisions or take actions that are not provided for in applicable,
specific statutes. Such a decision or action is "supplemental law."
Our use of the phrase "supplemental law" and our research does not include either
artful interpretation or exercises of discretion that a particular statute allows. We
only consider the court's authority to decide or act beyond, or different from,
statutory provisions on the basis of general authority apart from the provisions
themselves.
Our principal focus is Bankruptcy Code section 105(a)1, which we’ll refer to
simply as 105. It allows a bankruptcy court "to issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions"2 of the
Code. This section derives from the superseded Bankruptcy Act, section 2a(15)3,
which allowed "courts of bankruptcy" to "make such orders, issue such process,
and enter such judgments in addition to those specifically provided for as may be
necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of [the] act."4 Section 2a(15) was
cited dozens of times in reported decisions under the old Bankruptcy Act. Section
105 of the Bankruptcy Code has been cited in thousands of reported cases as an
authority to support a wide variety of judicial decisions and actions5.
Even in the early days of the Code, in 1982, Richard Levine, the first Director and
Counsel, Executive Office for the United States Trustees, warned that on the basis
of 105, courts "have begun to develop a concept of almost unlimited power."6 Ten
years later, in 1992, Chaim Fortgang and Erin Enright, prominent New York
bankruptcy practitioners, wrote that 105 "has developed into the ‘catchall’
provision of the Bankruptcy Code."7 This concept has now fully matured. Today,
105 is the authority behind an incredibly long list of powers now exercised by
bankruptcy courts.
Lawyers now commonly stand on 105 whenever the Code fails clearly to support
their clients’ position. They often seem to interpret 105 as a boundless source of
power that enables the bankruptcy judge to make up the law as she goes along
and, in so doing, to go where no member of Congress has gone before. Some
judges and lawyers believe that 105 enables a bankruptcy court to hang or

otherwise fit decisions within the framework of bankruptcy law whether or not the
bankruptcy statutes accommodate the decisions.
In this article we discuss the role of 105 in bankruptcy law generally rather than in
specific bankruptcy cases. We mention a few cases as examples. Mainly, we aim
at 105. We work toward an understanding of this section that explains our view of
the bottom issue that determines the proper role and use of 105 and also the
proper role and use of supplemental law generally.
Our view of section 105 as a source of supplemental law is different from the
view reflected by bankruptcy court decisions and actions. We do not believe that
105 authorizes "supplemental law." Indeed, we think 105 is largely, even
completely, redundant. We also think that some present uses of 105 are of
questionable constitutional validity.
Preliminarily, in order to focus clearly on section 105 and the scope of authority
the section gives bankruptcy courts, we separate other possible sources of
authority for bankruptcy courts to supplement the Bankruptcy Code. There are
three such sources: (1) inherent power, (2) federal common law and (3) equitable
nature of bankruptcy courts.
First, all courts have certain, inherent power. This power is real but small and
limited to process closely related to the conduct of court and functioning process.
Next, we consider the power of bankruptcy courts to create federal common law.
We also consider the courts' power on the basis of state law to supplement the
Bankruptcy Code with principles of common law and equity, especially including
the principles of traditional equity jurisprudence. These powers exist but are
tightly, narrowly constrained. We conclude that they are not sources of very wide,
general authority for applying supplemental law under the Bankruptcy Code.
Then we consider the legitimacy and meaning of the oft-quoted description of
bankruptcy courts as "courts of equity." We trace the source and find the meaning
of this description. It means that apart from state law and as a matter of federal
law, bankruptcy courts can apply principles of equity jurisprudence. These
principles are an ancient source of supplemental law, but the principles of equity
jurisprudence are doctrinally limited by their own terms and are also situationally
limited by any applicable statute that contradicts or restrains them. Moreover,
these principles do not include any power simply to do what seems fair, i.e. to "do
equity." Such a power requires a specific statutory license and even then is
restrained by legislative purpose and judicial precedent.
Finally we get to 105 as a basis of wholesale authority for bankruptcy courts to
supplement the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The end of our search is
anticlimactic. At most, and depending on whom you believe, 105 merely restates
the power given elsewhere for bankruptcy courts to issue necessary process and to

act as courts of equity in applying principles of equity jurisprudence. Section 105
is not itself a larger or wider or even different source of supplemental law.
Many cases dispute our conclusion. They apply 105 in many ways that are well
beyond the limits of equity jurisprudence. These cases make law under 105 as if
the section were a delegation of lawmaking power by Congress to the courts. This
interpretation may be supported by good policy, but it is not supported by
statutory language. Moreover, the Constitution forbids it. Indeed, the practice of
bankruptcy courts making law in any non-proximately, legislatively guided sense
is unconstitutional under any congressional grant of supplemental power to the
courts. It is unconstitutional regardless of the statutory basis of the power and
whether or not the judicial law fits perfectly within the scope of the delegated
power.
II.

Inherent Power (Procedural Common Law)
Federal district courts possess inherent authority to make procedural common law
for the purpose of protecting "their proceedings and judgments in the course of
discharging their traditional responsibilities."8 Presumably, bankruptcy courts
derivatively share this authority. Enforcing compliance with court orders through
the exercise of the contempt power is an obvious example of a court’s inherent
power.9
To a very small extent the courts’ inherent authority is constitutionally protected.
For the most part, however, this authority can be controlled or overridden by
Congress. Indeed, even the Supreme Court is constitutionally limited in
establishing federal rules of procedures. The role of the Court in promulgating
and maintaining the federal rules is on the basis of a congressional delegation of
authority in the Rules Enabling Act.10
The Rules Enabling Act limits the Court to making rules for practice and
procedure only. Affecting substantive rights is flatly prohibited, and the meaning
of "substantive rights" for this purpose may be growing.11 Therefore, the courts’
statutory authority to make procedural common law is shrinking. Also, the tiny
inherent authority that the courts possess on their own is even more limited. It is
not a source of meaningful supplemental law under the Bankruptcy Code.

III.

Making And Applying Substantive Common Law @
A.
As A Matter Of Federal Law @
Everybody remembers from the first year of law school that there is no
federal, general, substantive common law, especially not in diversity
cases. Erie12 and its progeny "so hold." We know this truth from the
"canned briefs" we bought when we were first-year law students. Federal
courts, unlike state courts, are not common-law courts13. Federal courts

"do not possess a general power to develop and apply their own rules of
decision,"14 because:
As the general structure of the Constitution and the tenth amendment
make clear, the framers anticipated that the federal government would
exercise only specifically enumerated powers. All other powers were
reserved to the states or the people. The federal judiciary, as a branch of
the federal government, is also limited by this specific enumeration of
powers. Thus, any assertion by the judiciary of a general power to make
law would encroach upon the powers reserved to the states.15
On the other hand, Erie does not control in matters covered by federal
statutes. In these matters it is possible, though not certainly clear, that
federal courts enjoy some little room to make true federal common law.16
Moreover, federal courts make what we will call interpretative federal
common law. Here we adopt Professor Field’s rightly wide definition of
federal common law, which is "any rule of federal law created by a court
(usually * * * a federal court) when the substance of that rule is not clearly
suggested by federal enactments -- constitutional or congressional."17
Making federal common law probably happens most often when federal
courts interpret federal statutes by adding gloss or inferring a rule after
finding that the statute permits the addition or inference, either generally
or with respect to a particular matter or issue.
Bankruptcy courts are units of the district courts19. Presumably, therefore,
bankruptcy courts share or derivatively enjoy the district courts’ power of
making federal common law. This power, which is separate from 105,
enables bankruptcy courts legitimately to supplement the Code, if only
interstitially, with substantive law.
In bankruptcy, however, the federal statutory and incorporated state law
are very comprehensive, and any constitutional or policy reasons for
looking to state law for filler are strong. While federal common law can
sometimes trump otherwise applicable state law when the federal interest
in doing so is sufficiently strong, the Supreme Court has clearly held that
state law is not easily trumped by federal common law created by
bankruptcy judges.20
Also, the Supreme Court has been equally clear that the Code’s literal
language must be followed closely so that proper occasion for
interpretative law is small.21 Very little room is therefore left for making
federal common law under the Bankruptcy Code.
In any event, bankruptcy-made federal common law is not the sort of
supplemental law that concerns us in this presentation. Bankruptcy judges

create federal common law, whatever the source or reference, under and
within the bounds of the bankruptcy statute. Our concern is limited to
judges’ deciding or acting beyond, or different from, statutory provisions
on the basis of general authority apart from the provisions themselves.
B.

As A Matter Of State Law
Bankruptcy courts more often create state common law. It happens
whenever the courts look to state law for substantive rights and liabilities
of the debtor and other parties. These rights and liabilities are almost
always governed by state law. In consulting state law for this purpose the
bankruptcy courts make common law by interpreting applicable state
statutes or by applying and developing pertinent state common law.
This state common law is not, however, the true supplemental law that
interests us. The bankruptcy courts are applying and are constrained by
specific statutes, or they are projecting common law that is also limited by
state statutory law and by local precedent. Moreover, in creating state
common law the bankruptcy courts are adding to state law on which the
Bankruptcy Code operates rather than to the Code itself.
Sometimes an applicable state statute empowers courts to use, as a kind of
supplemental law, state-law principles of common law and equity. The
best example is Uniform Commercial Code section 1-103,22 which
provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud,
misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other
validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.23
Bankruptcy courts applying local U.C.C. law will rely on 1-103 as
authority to supplement the statute with principles of common law and
equity. This process, too, is enabled and constrained by state law and does
not add supplemental law to the Bankruptcy Code. Furthermore, the
Bankruptcy Code can itself displace state law principles of common law
and equity.24

IV.

Bankruptcy Courts As Courts of Equity
Separately, bankruptcy courts apply equitable principles to directly affect the
Bankruptcy Code on the basis of the bankruptcy court’s supposed (though foggy)
status as a court of equity. Bankruptcy courts are commonly described as being or
having the powers of "courts of equity."25 Until recently, clear statutory support

existed for this status. No longer. Today, any such support is, at best, uncertain
and vague.
The first federal bankruptcy law, the 1800 Act, gave bankruptcy jurisdiction to the
district courts. The second law, the 1841 Act, also empowered the district courts
to exercise this jurisdiction summarily in the nature of summary proceedings in
equity. The district courts were thereby empowered to effectively act as equity
courts for purposes of bankruptcy. The Supreme Court made clear that, absent this
equitable jurisdiction power given by the 1841 Act, "the District Courts of the
United States possess no equity jurisdiction whatsoever; for the previous
legislation of Congress conferred no such authority upon them."26
The district courts’ equity power in bankruptcy matters was explicitly continued
under the 1867 Act27 and the 1898 Act. The critical language of the 1898 Act was
the very first part – the introductory part -- of section 2:
[T]he district courts of the United States * * * are hereby made
courts of bankruptcy, and are hereby invested * * * with such
jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise
original jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings * * * *. @
This language meant that "[a] bankruptcy court is a court of equity, … guided by
equitable doctrines and principles except in so far as they are inconsistent with the
[bankruptcy statute]."28 To be a court of equity means "at least * * * that, in the
exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it, it [the bankruptcy court] applies the
principles and rules of equity jurisprudence."
More recently, in 1978, Congress enacted section 1481 of Title 28 which provided
in pertinent part that "[a] bankruptcy court shall have the powers of a court of
equity." However, when the provisions of title 28 relating to bankruptcy courts
were amended in 1984 making the bankruptcy court a "unit" of the district court,
section 1481 was repealed.29 Accordingly, at present, nothing in the Bankruptcy
Code or related statutes explicitly gives equity jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts
that is different from or greater than the equity jurisdiction of a federal district
court.30
It is generally assumed, however, that, under the Code, bankruptcy courts are
equity courts31 and can apply equitable principles and rules. Section 105(a) is
sometimes cited as the basis for this status and power.32
It is simply not true that 105 is the basis for equity jurisdiction of courts in
bankruptcy. The legislative history of the section flatly reports that section 105(a)
is "derived from"33 Bankruptcy Act section 2a(15). Reconsider the language of
section 2:

a. The courts of the United States hereinbefore defined as courts of bankruptcy are
hereby created courts of bankruptcy and are hereby invested, within their
respective territorial limits as now established or as they may be hereafter
changed, with such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to
exercise original jurisdiction in proceedings under this Act, in vacation, in
chambers, and during their respective terms, as they are now or may be hereafter
held, to---(15) Make such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments, in
addition to those specifically provided for, as may be necessary for the
enforcement of the provisions of this Act: Provided, however, That an injunction
to restrain a court may be issued by the judge only; make such orders, issue such
process, and enter such judgments in addition to those specifically provided for as
may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act. (emphasis
added).34
The italicized prefatory language in section 2 is the statutory basis for bankruptcy
courts’ equitable power. Subsection 2a(15) did not itself give equity power to the
bankruptcy courts. So, section 105, as the modern successor of only subsection
2a(15), cannot itself give the courts this power.
The congressional reports behind 105 also explain that "105 is similar in effect to
the All Writs Statute, * * * under which the new bankruptcy courts are brought
[separately] by amendment to 28 U.S.C. 451 [which defines the meaning of court
for purposes of title 28]."35 So, prior to 1984, when bankruptcy courts were
separate courts, separate legislation brought them under the All Writs Statute.36
Section 105 was redundant in this respect. Now, of course, the meaning of court
in section 451 does not directly, explicitly include bankruptcy courts. So, the
connection between 105 and the All Writs Statute is completely empty.
We believe that the All Writs Statute still applies to bankruptcy courts, but only
indirectly or derivatively as units of the federal district courts. Still, the All Writs
Statute is not a source of equity power or other supplemental law. It is a source of
process only that must be closely related to fairly clear legislative intent.
Nevertheless, bankruptcy courts exercise equity power. The putative basis may be
the doubtful authority of 105; the murky authority of the long-ago merger of law
and equity in federal courts37; unsubstantiated case authority; or something else or
nothing whatsoever. The truth is that even without citing authority, bankruptcy
courts act as courts of equity in the sense of acting as though they are empowered
to apply equitable principles and rules.
Equitable principles and rules, however, are not a source of general authority to
act beyond or different from the Bankruptcy Code. So, even if there is a real and
lawful basis for bankruptcy judges to assume the role of equity chancellors, this
role gives them little legitimate reason or room to add substantive, supplemental
law to the Bankruptcy Code.

Equity does not empower the judge to create or depart from law in pursuit of
conscience or morality. It is a subset of principles, rules, and remedies well
constrained by hundreds of years of precedent that fairly precisely defines equity.
The important principles of equity were long ago all developed:38
[E]quity became a system of positive jurisprudence, peculiar
indeed, and differing from the common law, but founded upon and
contained in the mass of cases already decided. The Chancellor
was no longer influenced by his own conscience * * *. [Also,] * *
* there can be no more capricious enlargement according to the
will of individual chancellors.39
Although equitable principles can be adapted to novel conditions, "the broad and
fruitful principles of equity have been established and cannot be changed by any
judicial action."40
Moreover, these concrete principles are only applied to aid law, not to contradict
law or even add to law. The Supreme Court forcefully made this point in its recent
decision, Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo SA v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.41,
holding that the equity jurisdiction conferred on federal courts by the 1789
Judiciary Act did not empower a court to freeze assets for the benefit of creditors.
The Court stated:
We do not question the proposition that equity is flexible; but in
the federal system, at least, the flexibility is confined within the
broad boundaries of traditional, equitable relief. To accord a type
of relief that has never been available before – and especially (as
here) a type of relief that has been specifically disclaimed by
longstanding judicial precedent – is to invoke a "default rule," …
not of flexibility but of omnipotence.42
Clearly, equitable principles are subordinate and subservient to all law43,
including statutory law. So, especially when federal courts apply comprehensive
federal statutes, the use of equity is triggered by, and strictly limited by, the letter
and clear sense of the statutes. As courts of equity, therefore, bankruptcy courts
are not empowered to go beyond or depart from the Bankruptcy Code and create
supplemental law.
V.

Section 105(a)
Collier and other secondary sources have classified and criticized the cases
construing section 105.44 Some of these reported decisions seem premised on the
implicit if not explicit interpretation of section 105 as a direct, fresh, independent
grant of supplemental power to the bankruptcy courts.45

Under this broad interpretation, 105(a) does not re-state inherent or equitable
powers of courts elsewhere provided and otherwise limited. Rather, through
105(a), Congress separately delegated to bankruptcy courts the authority to act to
the limits of a wholly independent meaning of 105(a).
Under this broad meaning, 105(a) could be interpreted as a basis of authority to
fill in, extend, or retract the Bankruptcy Code in unprovided-for cases and
unanticipated circumstances in ways that are beyond particular provisions but
within the largest goals of bankruptcy. We can imagine appealing policy
arguments that support giving bankruptcy courts such authority.
We believe that some uses of 105(a) can only be explained by interpreting and
applying the statute this way. Good examples are partial discharge of student
loans46, substantive consolidation47, payment of "necessary" unsecured claims
early in a Chapter 11 case48, and permanently stretching the discharge to protect
non-debtors.49
We do not say that these uses are bad bankruptcy policies. We do, however, say
that such uses raise problems of statutory language and constitutional concepts.
The problems of statutory language are straight-forward. Section 105 is limited to
orders that "carry out the provisions of this title." Congress could have used the
word "policies" or the word "purposes" in section 105. It did not.50
The problems of constitutional concepts are different and more subtle. The
constitutional problem is not so much in Congress delegating wide powers to the
courts through 105(a). The real problem is that in exercising such wide powers,
the courts are making law to the extent of violating the constitutional separation
of powers. It makes no difference that Congress may have desperately wanted,
clearly intended, and explicitly provided for the courts to have such power.
Congress cannot widen the constitutional limits of judicial power.
The division of authority between the three branches of the federal government is
not exact or clear, but is flexible. Their responsibilities can permissibly overlap to
a point. The overlap is constitutionally too great, that is, the separation of powers
is offended, when the whole power of one branch is given to and exercised by
another branch; when excessive authority is accumulated in a single branch; or
when the authority and independence of one or another coordinate branch is
undermined.51
With respect to the judicial branch the special concerns are law that
"impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch"52 or the
assignment of "tasks that are more properly accomplished by [other] branches."53
So, when the Congress delegates certain authority to the courts, the seemingly
decisive issue in terms of separation of powers is whether the particular authority
is more properly exercised by another branch.

It’s a fuzzy scale generally that applies fully to law making. Courts cannot create
law in the sense of exercising Article I legislative power. On the other hand and at
the other extreme, applying and interpreting legislation are necessary and
essential judicial functions. In a sense, applying and interpreting law creates law
(albeit not "supplemental law"). In sum, the rule is probably that courts cannot
make law "except in conjunction with the lawful exercise of * * * judicial
power."54
In judging the legality of a court’s role under a statute, the separation-of-powers
issue is whether, on a flexible, fuzzy scale, the role exceeds lawful exercise of
judicial power under the statute and thus becomes unconstitutional law making.
We think it depends in large part on the proximity between the court’s
"legislative" decisions under the statute and the clarity and precision of the
policies expressed through the statute.
The issue is whether the court’s decision is necessary to a fairly specific and
certain statutory intention that drives and guides the judge’s decision making and
her related actions. It is not enough, for separation of powers, that the court’s
decision is compatible with relatively undefined or general legislative purposes,
not even when these general purposes are clearly and forcefully expressed.
The likelihood of unconstitutional law-making by courts in applying statutes is
directly related to the distance between the courts’ decisions or actions under the
statute and a well-defined congressional judgment about the matter behind the
statute. The farther the stretch, the more likely judicial lawmaking is
unconstitutional.
So, the ultimate question about partial discharge and all other judicial
supplements to the Bankruptcy Code is whether they are too much of a
legislatively projected reach from the statute to the decision. If so, the
supplements may violate the Constitution even if they somehow satisfy the
language of 105(a).
It’s possible, too, that such supplements are not saved by having roots in
traditional equity jurisprudence. Remember: we are not completely sure if, why,
and to which extent bankruptcy courts are courts of equity. We are sure that even
if they are fully courts of equity, this status gives little reason or room for making
supplemental law. Also, it is never been entirely clear how far the Constitution
permits the judicial branch, either on its own or through congressional grant, to
exercise equitable power, but we cannot imagine that any such authority trumps
Article I of the Constitution. Courts cannot exercise Article I legislative power
directly through 105 or any other statute or indirectly through equity.
VI.

Conclusion

For more than thirty years and in thousands of reported cases, bankruptcy judges
and lawyers have thought about section 105. They have thought about 105 in
terms of statutory interpretation, in terms of legislative history, in terms of other
reported decisions, in terms of bankruptcy policy, in terms of doing equity. We
recognize that these cases are of real importance and value to the bench and bar,
which is why we are developing a Web site that collects all of these cases and also
collects other supplemental law authorities.
We suggest, however, that from now on, judges and lawyers should also think of
105 in constitutional terms. We join the call of Professor Robert F. Nagel of the
University of Colorado Law School who, writing more than 20 years ago about
the limits of federal courts’ equitable remedies generally, urged: "[l]egal
commentators and courts should begin the potentially constructive business of
deciding how separation of powers applies to the scope of equitable relief in
particular cases."55
Finally, we suggest that judges and lawyers also think of section 105 in musical
terms when deciding how the section fits within the whole of the Bankruptcy
Code. We join the lament of the Oak Ridge Boys in their gospel classic, Rhythm
Guitar:
Nobody wants to play rhythm guitar behind Jesus.
It seems like everybody wants to be the lead singer in the band
I know it's hard to get a beat on what's divine
When everybody's pushing toward the head of the line
I don't think that its working out at all the way He planned.
We suggest that, musically and constitutionally, section 105 is at most a rhythm
guitar.56
* This article was prepared for a panel discussion at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the National Conference
of Bankruptcy Judges.
** C. C. Hope Chair in Financial Services and Law, Wake Forest University. Steve Nickles is grateful for
the support of Wake Forest University and the Hope family.
*** Charles E. Tweedy Jr. Chair in Law, University of Alabama. David Epstein, by nature an ungrateful
sort, acknowledges the support of the University of Alabama School of Law Foundation and the Tweedy
family, and the earlier support of his partners at King & Spalding, which enables him and his family to live
really well. David Epstein also is grateful to Steve Nickles for doing all of the work on this article and to
Alabama colleagues such as Tony Freyer, Susan Hamill, Jerry Hoffman, Wythe Holt, and Ken Randall for
their critical and/or encouraging comments and suggestions. Since David Epstein ignored all of their
suggestions, Steve Nickles bears full responsibility for any errors in this paper.
1. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1999).
2. Id.
3. Bankr. Act § 2a(15); 11 U.S.C. § 12(a)(15) (repealed).
4. Id.
5. To state the obvious [or at least what is obvious to us old timers] there were fewer bankruptcy cases and
virtually no reports of the decisions of bankruptcy judges under the Bankruptcy Act.
6. Richard L. Levine, An Enhanced Conception of the Bankruptcy Judge: From Case Administrator to
Unbiased Adjudicator, 84 W. VA. L. REV. 637, 653 (1982).

7. Chaim J. Fortgang and Erin Enright, "Carry Out the Provisions" and Section 105, at 3, (Paper presented
at New York University Law School Workshop on Bankruptcy and Business Reorganization (1992)).
8. Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823, 116 S. Ct. 1777, 1780, 135 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1996).
9. See In re McLean Indus., 68 B.R. 690, 695 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("All courts . . . have inherent
contempt powers to enforce compliance with their lawful orders."). But cf. Kellogg v. Chester, 71 B.R. 36,
37 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986) ("[S]ection 105 in the first instance grants to bankruptcy courts the power to
issue final orders of contempt insofar as such orders are necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions
of title 11.").
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
11. See generally Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking "Substantive Rights" (In the Rules Enabling Act) More
Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47 (1998).
12. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("[t]here is no federal general common law").
13. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981).
14. Id.
15. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1985).
16. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 60 (5th ed. 1994).
17. Martha Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 890
(1986). Cf. Martin Redish, Federal Common Law and American Political Theory: A Response to Professor
Weinberg, 83 NW. U.L. REV. 853, 857 (1989) ("When a court engages in statutory interpretation, it asks
'What did the legislature intend?' When it creates common law, it asks 'what is the best policy choice?'").
18. Defining federal common law so broadly, especially including interpretation, is not uncommon. In fact,
it is accepted. See Martha Field, supra note 17, at 890-92; Thomas W. Merrill, supra note 15, at 4-5.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1999).
20. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54, 99 S.Ct. 914, 918 (1979).
21. See generally Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme
Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535 (1993); Adam James Wiensch, Note, The Supreme
Court, Textualism, and the Treatment of Pre-Bankruptcy Code Law, 79 GEO. L.J. 1831, 1859 et seq.
(1991).
22. U.C.C. § 1-103.
23. Id.
24. In re Omegas Group, Inc., 16 F.3d 1443, 1452-53 (6th Cir. 1994) (State-law imposing constructive trust
on property debtor obtained by fraud is inconsistent with goals of bankruptcy and is displaced by
bankruptcy law.).
25. E.g., Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240, 54 S.Ct. 695, 697 (1934)("But otherwise courts of
bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity and their proceedings inherently proceedings in equity."); Kaiser
Aerospace & Elec. Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 229 B.R. 860, 871 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999) ("Section
105(a)'s broad statutory directive that bankruptcy courts shall have the power to issue any order necessary
to effectuate a Chapter 11 plan is consistent with the general understanding that these tribunals are courts of
equity.").
26. Ex Parte, The City Bank of New Orleans in the Matter of William Christy, 44 U.S. 292, 311-12 (1845).
27. The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 again designated the district courts as courts of bankruptcy but did not
expressly provide for them to act in equity. It was implicit that in bankruptcy, the district courts acted as
courts of equity.
28. SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455, 60 S. Ct. 1044, 1053 (1940)
(citing Bankruptcy Act § 2).
29. See Industrial Tool Distrib., Inc., 55 B.R. 746, 749 fn.6 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985).
30. Cf. Robert A. Greenfield, The National Bankruptcy Conference's Position on the Court System Under
the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 and Suggestions for Rules Promulgation,
23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 358, 360 (1986).
31. E.g. United States v. Energy Resources, Inc., 495 U.S. 545, 549, 110 S.Ct. 2139, 109 L. Ed. 2d 580
(1990); In re Nikoloutsos, 199 F.3d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 2000); But for a very recent, thoughtful, very rare
cautionary view, see generally Honorable Marcia A. Krieger, "The Bankruptcy Court Is a Court of Equity":
What Does That Mean?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 275 (1999).
32. Section 105 has been cited (probably wrongly) as independent authority for using supplemental
equitable principles in bankruptcy. In re Momentum Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d 1132 (2d Cir. 1994) (Section 105
supports bankruptcy court applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel.); In re Lapiana, 909 F.2d 221 (7th

Cir. 1990) (Bankruptcy rights are subject to well-recognized equitable defenses, such as estoppel; and the
courts possibly can create new equitable defenses.).
33. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 51 (1978), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5837; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at
342 (1978), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6298.
34. Bankr. Act § 2a(15); 11 U.S.C. § 12(a)(15) (repealed).
35. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595 (1977).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994).
37. The district courts, and presumably the bankruptcy courts operating as units of the district courts, "have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treatises of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1999). Because of the merger of law and equity in federal courts, some people
interpret "civil actions" in section 1331 to encompass traditional equity jurisdiction. John F. Duffy,
Administrative Coimmon Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 147 n.173 (1998).
38. 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 59, at 75 (Spencer Symons, 5th ed. 1941).
39. Id. at 75-76.
40. Id. § 60, at 78.
41. 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
42. Id. at 333.
43. Admittedly, though, distinguishing equity from common law is very artifical in that the worlds are
largely merged by procedure and also by judicial legislation that has absorbed much of the former into the
latter. For present purposes, distinguishing equity from common law is also pointless because there is no
general, federal common law and also because we are entirely interested in the exercise of equitable powers
within and under statutes.
44. E.g., 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 105.01[2] (15th ed. 1999); Manuel D. Leal, The Power of the
Bankruptcy Court: Section 105, 29 S. TEX. L. REV. 487 (1988).
45. E.g., In re Morgan, 182 F.3d 775 (11th Cir. 1999) (tolling of priority period); In re Brown, 239 B.R.
204 (Bankr. S. D. Cal. 1999)(partial discharge of student loan).
46. See generally Cara A. Morea, Note, Student Loan Discharge in Bankruptcy-It Is Time for a Unified
Equitable Appraoch, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 193 (1998).
47. See generally Mary Elizabeth Kors, Altered Egos: Deciphering Substantive Consolidation, 59 U. PITT.
L. REV. 381 (1998).
48. See generally CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 11.12 (1997).
49. See generally Ralph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex Litigtion: A Critical Reappraisal
of Non-debtor Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 959 (1997).
50. Some courts, however, seem to use the words "provisions" and "purposes" interchangeably. E.g., In re
Gurny, 192 B.R. 529, 539 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996); In re Simmons, 224 B.R. 879, 884 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1998). See also In re Offshore Diving and Salvaging, Inc., 1999 WL 961763 (E.D. La 1999) ("This court
agrees that recognizing equitable power to toll Section 507 under § 105(a) does not violate any Bankruptcy
Code provision or policy and is in fact consistent with Congressional policy. Accordingly, the Court
affirms the bankruptcy court's determination that Section 105(a) is broad enough to provide for equitable
tolling of the priority period in 507(a).").
51. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381, 109 S. Ct. 647, 659, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714, 786 (1989).
52. Id. at 383.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 661, 724 (1978).
56. While we both agree that section 105 corresponds to a rhythm guitar, at least one of the authors is illequipped to identify what corresponds to Jesus.

